Southern Mercury

Volume 2, No. 2 March/April 2004

The DuPont Seven

by Michael W. Masters

In the fall of 2000, the DuPont Advanced Fiber Systems' Spruance facility at Richmond, Virginia, instituted a corporate policy banning all Confederate symbols from the plant environs. Despite the fact that Black, Hispanic and homosexual network affiliations benefit from explicit corporate support as favored groups, not so much as a single Confederate symbol is allowed on clothing, personal possessions, pictures, photographs or automobile bumper stickers. Only special Virginia Sons of Confederate Veterans' license plates are excepted -- possibly because such a position would be untenable, even under current highly discriminatory "anti-discrimination" laws.

Announcement of this anti-Confederate policy initiated an uncertain odyssey of personal, legal and financial travail for seven DuPont employees who chose to challenge the DuPont policy -- a journey through the court system that continues to this day. Their disturbing peregrinations are typical of the social, political and legal conflict extant in post-Western multicultural America. The position taken by DuPont and the strategy adopted in response by trial attorney Kirk Lyons of the Southern Legal Resource Center (SLRC) on behalf of the "Dupont 7," reveals much about the Culture War currently being waged against traditional Americans in general and Southerners in particular.

The situation at DuPont is, in fact, by no means unusual. Most large corporations, especially multinational ones, support virtually every tenent of liberalism, including multiculturalism, feminism and homosexual favoritism. These "-isms" are fueled by utter disdain for traditional Western norms and values. Increasingly, non-American and un-American corporations are successful in imposing such predilection on their helpless employees largely because American laws and court precedents not only permit legalized discrimination, but in fact virtually demand it.

The fact that this battle is being fought in courts, legislatures and executive offices rather than the killing fields of the 1860s American South does not diminish the issues contended. Ultimately, the stakes are whether or not distinct peoples who are not explicitly named in statutes or court decisions will be able to obtain equal protection under the law. If they cannot, they will ultimately be legally disenfranchised by those protected groups, a process that, in fact, has been underway since the 1960s. And, while Southerners are a prime target today, it seems inevitable that all Americans of Western heritage will eventually be dispossessed by the same extrinsic forces unless the trend is reversed.

Mr. Lyons' strategy with the DuPont 7 case is to try to establish as legal precedent the (self-evident!) fact that Southerners are a culturally distinct group with a common ancestry -- and as such are entitled to protection as a "national origin" group under civil rights statutes.

Opponents counter that the Confederacy is not a nation. However, cases that lend support to Mr. Lyons' contention have been decided in various federal courts. Included are Serbians (pre-Yugoslavian dissolution); American Indians (whose tribes were never separate nations); and the Acadians of Louisiana (the ethnic sub group known as Cajuns). Others include Creoles, the Roma (commonly known as Gypsies), and Puerto Ricans. Lyons argues that national origin is defined as the place your ancestors came from. One's place of origin does not have to be a nation in being or even ever to have been a nation.

Needless to say, those for whom tolerance is a one-way street are fighting back.

According to the DuPont 7 web site, the Seven's odyssey began on July 9, 2000, when the first of the employees "was called into his supervisor's office and told he was forbidden to wear a shirt showing Southern emblems and was ordered not to wear anything showing the Confederate Flag." He was also told to remove a mug "showing a Confederate emblem, the religious Cross of Saint Andrew, the Apostle of Jesus the Christ, and a book containing information about his Southern ancestors."

On August 9, the DuPont employee union filed a grievance with management. The grievance claimed that DuPont was biased and inconsistent with its workplace policies. From the DuPont 7 web site: "A DuPont network organization, reflecting African heritage is encouraged and embraced by DuPont. African emblems are not banned on DuPont property." Another organization, Bisexual, Gay, Lesbian, Transgendered and Allies at DuPont, operates with approval at the DuPont Spruance facility. Furthermore, "[t]he B-Glad homosexual rainbow flag is encouraged, embraced and welcomed on DuPont property and grounds." A DuPont network organization for Hispanics is "embraced and encouraged by DuPont Management. Hispanic flags and emblems are not banned on DuPont property."

On September 14, DuPont issued an internal memorandum which stated that the "purpose of this communication is to eliminate any question or reservation regarding the appropriateness of the display of the Confederate Flag. Management must understand that displaying the Confederate Flag on plant property is prohibited and a violation of our standards of a respectful work environment." According to the transcript of a subsequent federal court hearing, an attorney representing DuPont stated that "to the largest number of people there, [the Confederate Flag] was an offensive symbol. And they [DuPont management] are just not going to have that war fought on their property while they are trying to do business." Finally, on September 28 DuPont management issued a letter denying the grievance.

At this point, the affected employees sought legal help from Kirk Lyons and SLRC at Black Mountain, North Carolina. Once again citing the DuPont 7 web site, SLRC "approached the EEOC [Equal Employment Opportunity Commission], alleging discrimination based on race, religion and national origin: Christian Confederate Southern-American." The EEOC refused to act on the employees' behalf but did issue a "right to sue" letter.

In late 2000, the seven employees began a weekly vigil outside the entrance to the Spruance facility. That vigil continues to this day, rain or shine. The reaction of passers-by has been markedly favorable, a reaction that surely cannot please DuPont. We encourage all lovers of Southern heritage to join these brave men in their protest. The vigil takes place every Thursday from 4 - 6 p.m. -- or you can pick your own day and time. For more information, contact Jimmy Jones at: jcuda8@aol.com or 804-350-7579.

In order to file a lawsuit, the local rules of Virginia federal courts require that plaintiffs be represented by a local attorney. Mr. Lyons secured the services of Richmond civil rights attorney Thomas Roberts as the attorney of record for the suit against DuPont. Finally, on May 30, 2003, papers were filed in Federal court on behalf of the DuPont 7. Reports of pressure on Roberts soon surfaced, and on September 11, 2003, Roberts served but did not file a Motion to Withdraw as local counsel. Mr. Lyons attempted to contact Mr. Roberts but, according to Lyons, got no response. Then, despite his announced intention to withdraw, Roberts served DuPont with the Dupont 7 lawsuit on September 17, 2003. The Dupont 7 web site states that, "[w]ith no notice to the clients and, more importantly, no hearing, the Court allow[ed] Roberts to withdraw and orders Mr. Lyons to be 'expeditious' in finding new local counsel."

Seeking to comply with the court's order, Mr. Lyons called every trial lawyer in the Richmond area. There were no takers. One must ask readers to consider why? Was every lawyer in Richmond so intimidated by DuPont's corporate presence in the old Capital of the Confederacy that none dared take the case? We cannot, of course, answer this question. But if the answer is yes, then it speaks volumes about the role of corporate influence in America.

On October 16, SLRC received DuPont's Motion to Dismiss. The Court, "apparently realizing that a severe due process problem was looming" (DuPont 7 web site) attempted to find an attorney who would serve as local counsel on SLRC's behalf. Once again, there were no takers. The Court dismissed the DuPont 7 law suit on November 25.

The dismissal made no referance to numerous affidavits filed under oath by many Confederate Southern-Americans in the Sons of Confederate Veterans testifying to their identity as a legitimate national origin group. Affidavits were provided by SCV Commander-in-Chief Ron Wilson, Brag Bowling, H.K. Edgerton, Past Chief of Heritage Defense Roger W. McCredie, Chaplain-in-Chief John Weaver, Past Chaplain-in-Chief Father Alister Anderson, Dr. Clyde Wilson and others.

In order to allow matters to proceed, the Court issued an order (just before dismissing the case) that contravened local rules, allowing Mr. Lyons to practice without local counsel. On January 15, the Court denied Mr. Lyons' Motion to Reconsider and told DuPont to file a motion by January 20 for fees and costs to be assessed against the Dupont 7. The reason was that Mr. Lyons was said to have filed a "frivolous" law suit. Oral arguments were scheduled for January 30, at the Federal Courthouse in Richmond -- ironically the old Confederate Treasury Building and site of President Jefferson Davis' office outside the White House.

It may have occurred to the astute reader to wonder why the local Richmond attorney for the Plaintiffs served DuPont with the DuPont 7 lawsuit after announcing his possible withdrawal from the case but before actually withdrawing. Not surprisingly, the suit and then withdrawing put SLRC and the Dupont 7 at a virtually unrecoverable disadvantage. What chain of cause-and-effect lay behind this sequence of events? We leave this question for readers' consideration.

To most people not trained at law, this would appear to be a case of denial of the 1st Amendment right of free speech. However, prior court decisions have established the right of private employers to limit speech in the workplace -- except in South Carolina and Louisiana. As a private employer, DuPont is restrained only by the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Realizing that the machinery of the last 40 years of civil rights legislation is geared toward protected status based on race, religion and national origin, Mr. Lyons chose to move forward based on the claim that the DuPont 7 were being disciminated against because they were "white Christian Confederate Southern-Americans."

Lyons explained why each part of the above characterization was chosen. "White because DuPont assumed anyone displaying Confederate symbols must be a kluxer. Being labeled a "racist" in corporate America is not career-enhancing and thus is an adverse employment action. Denial of Heritage should be an adverse employment action, but to modern courts it is only an irritant or inconvenience -- if you are not a protected species. Religious discrimination, because the Confederate flag is viewed as a Christian symbol by the Plaintiffs -- i.e. Cross of St. Andrew, etc. Confederate Southern American as national origin because Plaintiffs' ancestors were citizens of the Confederate State of Virginia, and Plaintiffs were discriminated against because they displayed a venerated symbol of their ancestry and that former nation. In national origin, national = ancestry."

At the January 30 federal court hearing to determine penalties against Lyons and attorneys fees to be levied against the DuPont 7, lawyers representing DuPont argued that Mr. Lyons acted in bad faith for filing on a claim that the 4th Circuit had already ruled against in another case, Terrill v. Chao. In one poignant exchange DuPont attorneys claimed that the DuPont 7 lawsuit was frivolous on its face. "If the lawsuit was frivolous on its face, then why did it take you 250 hours of attorney time to discover that," Judge Hudson retorted.

(The Plaintiff in Terrill was denied the right of appearing as a Confederate at this federal employer's multicultural day. It may be that the Terrill v. Chao case is not binding. Terrill was dismissed on a different procedure and is unpublished -- thus it cannot presently be used as precedent.)

DuPont also contended bad faith because Lyons could not prove (according to DuPont) that there is such a group as Confederate Southern-Americans and in so filing was trying to make new law by judicial decision. Ignoring the many affidavits previously mentioned (and two hundred years of American history), an attorney for DuPont stated,

"Your Honor, there is no basis under any reading of national origin, under any reading of race, or under any reading of religion, that people can self-impose upon themselves this diagnosis of a condition being known to the plaintiffs as this national origin ... In that regard, also, there's no legitimate reason to extend the law as it exists today."

Judge Hudson noted that Terrill v. Chao is in fact an unpublished and therefore non-binding opinion. The Court also acknowledged that Mr. Lyons' effort to make new law or expand existing law was in fact a legitimate legal objective. Regarding the use of court proceedings to "make new law," Judge Hudson added what could be taken as implicit recognition of the validity of such an approach, if not outright approval.

"Now, Mr. Lyons, I am one that has a great deal of respect for people in America that stand for something, because that is what made this country great, people that stand for a position, right or wrong, okay? And that's what makes the First Amendment such a precious part of our Constitution."

The appearance of judicial approbation turned out to be illusory. When the judge's written ruling finally emerged, Mr. Lyons was sanctioned the sum of $10,000. The Dupont 7 were ordered to pay DuPont a total of $27,550 in attorney's fees and expenses.

DuPont has already started collection measures. To stop collection, Lyons and the Dupont 7 must post a bond for the whole amount of the judgment plus interest. Lyons and the DuPont 7 intend to go forward with an appeal. According to Lyons, "not appealing will have a chilling effect on any attorney and client who seek to expand the interpretion of existing law or make new law."

The final outcome of this case remains to be determined, but one thing is certain. DuPont never contested the fact that they discriminated against the DuPont 7. They simply claimed that there was no law that required them not to disciminate. According to the law suit filed by the SLRC,

"Around September 2000, Mike Mayberry, Site Staff Manager of Defendant, issued an Employee Information Bulletin stating that Confederate symbols would not be allowed on DuPont property including clothing, newspapers, pictures and photographs and bumper stickers on cars ... When [a Dupont 7 plaintiff] protested the banning of Confederate symbols, Mayberry explained "Get over it!" I'm discriminating against you and there ain't nothing you can do about it, so get over it!"

At this point we should ask, what is the larger meaning of this case? How does it bear on the future of Confederate heritage? Indeed, what does it say about the future of the Confederate people -- and of any distinct people not granted legally protected status?

Reflecting on the case, Mr. Lyons observed, "In many ways this case is Dred Scott and Plessy v. Ferguson for us rolled into one. On one level the court (as the Supreme Court did to Blacks in Scott) has made it clear that Confederate Southern Americans have no rights which the court, society or government is bound to respect, and like the 60-year fight of the civil rights industry to destabilize the South (after the Supreme Court's institutionalization of segregation following Plessy) we have a very long way to go. Outright hostility, mockery and distortion of our legal positions and theories are the norms -- and we face a "political" trial every time we walk into a courtroom with a Confederate Flag."

The eminent biologist and ecologist Garrett Hardin (recently deceased) once observed that many groups deliberately exploit our better nature in order to advance their own self-interest. "[S]uch verbal devices as 'principles,' 'liberty,' and 'fairness' can be used as competitive weapons." This strategy is only effective when wielded against a moral people. "Offendedness" becomes a weapon with which to attack those who, true to their kind nature, wish not to offend. Of people who employ this strategy, the late 19th Century French writer, Louis Veuillot, wrote, "When I am the weaker, I ask you for my freedom, because that is your principle; but when I am the stronger, I take away your freedom, because that is my principle."

There is another reason why the outcome of this case is a matter of surpassing importance for the future of America's founding population -- most of whom do not fall in a protected category. The Census Bureau has just announced that, at present Third World immigration rates, by 2050 Americans of European descent -- Southerners included -- will be a minority in America. Does anyone seriously believe that, once reduced to minority status, Southerners and their non-Southern cousins will suddenly be granted protected status by those who subscribe to the principle Monsieur Veuillot enunciated over a century ago?

In fact, the efforts of multicultural entities to suppress Confederate heritage and any renewed sense of Southern cultural identity pays Southern activists the highest possible compliment. Mr. Lyons believes that "the US government and corporate America fears our seeking national origin status under the Civil Rights act of 1964 for Confederate Southern Americans because it may wake a sleeping giant in Southern factories and it would essentially legitimize or recognize the Confederate nation's right to have existed."

Meanwhile, the Dupont 7's vigil will go on. Both they and Mr. Lyons have vowed, "We will not give up." As Southerners you can help, both financially and in person, by supporting the DuPont 7 and SLRC at www.slrc-csa.org.